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Abstract. Recently, some collisions have been exposed for a variety of cryptographic
hash functions [20, 21] including some of the most widely used today. Many other
hash functions using similar constructions can however still be considered secure.
Nevertheless, this has drawn attention on the need for new hash function designs.
In this article is presented a family of secure hash functions, whose security is directly
related to the syndrome decoding problem from the theory of error-correcting codes.
Taking into account the analysis by Coron and Joux [4] based on Wagner’s generalized
birthday algorithm [19] we study the asymptotical security of our functions. We
demonstrate that this attack is always exponential in terms of the length of the hash
value.
We also study the work-factor of this attack, along with other attacks from coding
theory, for non asymptotic range, i.e. for practical values. Accordingly, we propose a
few sets of parameters giving a good security and either a faster hashing or a shorter
description for the function.
Key words: cryptographic hash functions, provable security, syndrome decoding, NP-
completeness, Wagner’s generalized birthday problem.
1 Introduction
The main cryptographic hash function design in use today iterates a so called compression
function according to Merkle’s and Damg˚ard’s constructions [6, 12]. Classical compression
functions are very fast [13, 16] but, in general, cannot be proven secure. However, provable
security may be achieved with compression functions designed following public key princi-
ples, at the cost of being less efficient. This has been done for instance by Damg˚ard in [6],
where he designed a hash function based on the Knapsack problem. Accordingly, this func-
tion has been broken by Granboulan and Joux [8], using lattice reduction algorithms. The
present paper contributes to the hash function family by designing functions based on the
syndrome decoding problem, which is immune to lattice reduction based attacks.
Unlike most other public key cryptosystems, the encryption function of the McEliece
cryptosystem [10] (or of Niederreiter’s version [14]) is nearly as fast as a symmetric cipher.
Using this function with a random matrix instead of the usual parity check matrix of a
Goppa code, a provably secure one-way function has been constructed in [1]: since there is
no trapdoor, its security can be readily related to the difficulty of syndrome decoding. For
instance, there is no polynomial time algorithm to decode a random code, thus there is no
polynomial time algorithm to invert the compression function and/or find a collision.
However, for the practical parameters which have been proposed in [1], there is an
efficient attack with a cost as low as 243 (or 262 depending on the set of parameters), as
demonstrated by Coron and Joux [4], using Wagner’s method for the generalized birthday
problem [19].
The purpose of this paper is to propose updated parameters for the hash function family
presented in [1]. We do not only extend the parameters to be out of reach of the Coron-Joux
attack, but we also thoroughly study the asymptotical behavior of their attack. We shall
establish that this attack is exponential, such that the design for the hash function is sound.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the Fast Syndrome Based
(FSB) compression function, derived from a hard problem similar to syndrome decoding. In
Section 3 we show that the security of FSB is reduced to the average case difficulty of two
new NP-complete problems. Then, in Section 4, we show how the best known decoding tech-
niques, and the new method based on Wagner’s ideas, can be adapted to the cryptanalysis
of our functions. From that we can evaluate the practical security and the scalability of the
system. In Section 5, we propose some choices of parameters and, eventually, we compare
the obtained functions with other existing constructions. For clarity of the presentation,
NP-completeness proofs are postponed in the appendix.
2 The Hash Function
We present here what is called the Fast Syndrome Based (FSB) hash function in [1].
2.1 General Construction of Hash Functions
We follow Merkle’s and Damg˚ard’s design principle of hash functions [6, 12]: iterating a
compression function (here denoted F), which takes as input s bits and returns r bits (with
s > r). The resulting function is then chained to operate on strings of arbitrary length (see
Fig. 1). The validity of such a design has been established [6, 12], and its security is proven
not worse than the security of the compression function. Therefore we will only concentrate
on the security of the latter.
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Fig. 1. A standard hash function construction.
2.2 Description of the Compression Function
The core of the compression function is a random binary matrix H of size r × n. The
parameters for the hash function are:
– n the number of columns of H;
– r the number of rows of H and the size in bits of the function output;
– w the number of columns of H added at each round.
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Definition 1. A word of length n and weight w is called regular if it has exactly one non-
zero position in each of the w intervals
r
(i− 1) n
w
; i
n
w
z
i=1..w
. We call a block such an
interval.
In order to encode a regular word of length n and Hamming weight w, s = w log2(
n
w )
bits are needed. This is the size in bits of the input of the compression function F . When
practical parameters will be chosen, it will be made in such a manner that round figures for
log2(
n
w ) are obtained. That is
n
w has to be a power of 2 and ideally, for software efficiency,
log2(
n
w ) too.
The matrix H is split into w sub-blocks Hi, of size r × nw , and the algorithm describingF is:
FSB compression function
Input: s bits of data
1. split the s input bits in w parts s1, . . . , sw of log2(
n
w ) bits;
2. convert each si to an integer between 1 and nw ;
3. choose the corresponding column in each Hi;
4. add the w chosen columns to obtain a binary string of length r.
Output: r bits of hash
The speed of F is directly related to the number of XORs required at each round: one
needs to XOR w columns of r bits, that is wr binary XORs. The number of bits read in the
document at each round is w log2
n
w − r (input size minus chaining size). Hence, the average
number of binary XORs required for each document input bit is:
NXOR = r · w
w log2
n
w − r
.
This value will be the right measure for the global speed of the FSB hash function.
3 Theoretical Security
As stated in [11, 17], a cryptographic hash function has to be pre-image resistant, second
pre-image resistant and collision resistant. As the second pre-image resistance is strictly
weaker than collision resistance, we will only check that the hash function is collision free
and resistant to inversion. We show that the inversion and collision finding are related to
two problems very close to syndrome decoding, which is a hard problem [3]. We describe
them here and show (in appendix) that they are also NP-complete.
3.1 Two New NP-complete Problems
Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD)
Input: w matrices Hi of dimension r × nw and a bit string S of length r.
Property: there exists a set of w columns, one in each Hi, summing to S.
Definition 2. A 2-regular word is a word of weight less than or equal to 2w, which contains
either 0 or 2 non zero positions in each block. It is the sum of two regular words.
2-Regular Null Syndrome Decoding (2-RNSD)
Input: w matrices Hi of dimension r × nw .
Property: there exists a set of 2w′ columns (with 0 < w′ ≤ w), 0 or 2 in each Hi, summing
to 0.
Thus solving 2-Regular Null Syndrome Decoding requires to find a non null 2-
regular word of weight less than or equal to 2w.
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3.2 Security Reduction
In this section we will recall how finding collisions or inverting the FSB hash function is
exactly as hard as solving an instance of one of the NP-complete problems described in the
previous section.
Let us be given an algorithm for the inversion of the compression function, which, given
a hash value S, finds an inverse m such that F(m) = S, in time T with probability p
of success. Then it is a tautology that this algorithm is able to solve any instance of the
problem Regular Syndrome Decoding, in the same time and with the same probability
of success. Similarly an algorithm which is able to find a collision gives in fact two different
regular words c1 and c2 of weight w such Hct1 = Hc
t
2. Then c = c1⊕c2 is a non null 2-regular
word and has a null syndrome. So c is directly a solution for 2-Regular Null Syndrome
Decoding.
These reductions to NP-complete problems only prove worst case difficulty. However,
following Gurevich and Levin [7, 9] discussion for syndrome decoding, we believe that both
these problems are difficult on average.
3.3 Average Case Consideration
From a cryptographic point of view, knowing that some instances of a problem are hard is
not enough to consider it a hard problem. It is more important that the number of weak
instances is small enough, that is, the probability of having to solve such a weak instance
when attacking the system is negligible.
However, defining a weak instance is not so simple as it will depend on the algorithm
used to attack the system: the instances solved with the smallest complexity will vary when
changing algorithm. A weak instance should hence be defined as an instance which is weak
for at least one algorithm: an instance for which one algorithm yields a noticeably smaller
complexity than the average complexity of the best algorithm.
A problem should not be considered hard if the proportion of those weak instances among
the total number of possible instances is not negligible. When trying to find collisions for
FSB, each binary r × n matrix defines a different instance. In Section 4.6, after seeing the
possible attacks on the system, we will try to estimate the proportion of these matrices
defining such a weak instance.
4 Practical Security
We recall the possible practical attacks on the compression function F , and study the
minimal work-factors required to perform these attacks. There are two kinds of algorithms:
Information Set Decoding and Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Paradox. We will survey
the results on Information Set Decoding algorithm, which has been studied in [1]. As for
Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Paradox [19], we will give an extended analysis: first we
slightly generalize Wagner’s algorithm, then we describe how its complexity is exponential
when the length of the hash value goes to infinity.
4.1 Information Set Decoding
The problem of decoding a random code has been extensively studied and many algorithms
devoted to this task have been developed (see [2] for a survey). All these algorithms are
exponential. Still, as stated by Sendrier [18], the most efficient attacks all seem to be derived
from Information Set Decoding (ISD).
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Definition 3. An information set is a set of k = n−r (the dimension of the code) positions
among the n positions of the support.
Definition 4. Let ((Hi)1≤i≤w, w,S) be an instance of RSD. An information set will be
called valid with respect to the instance if there exists a solution to this problem which has
no 1s among the k positions of the set.
The ISD algorithm consists in picking information sets at random, until a valid one is found.
Checking whether the information set is valid or not is done in polynomial time3, so the
exponential nature of the algorithm originates from the exponentially small probability of
finding a valid information set: let V (r) be the cost of checking the validity of an information
set, and Pw the probability for a random information set to be valid; then the complexity
of this algorithm is V (r)/Pw.
The probability Pw depends on the probability Pw,1, that a given information set is valid
for one given solution of RSD, and on the expected number Nw of solutions to RSD. We
shall consider:
Pw = 1− (1− Pw,1)Nw .
For simplicity, we will use the convenient approximation Pw ' Pw,1 ×Nw.
In the case of RSD, one needs to find a regular word of weight w having a given syndrome
S. The number of regular solutions to RSD is, on average:
Nw =
(
n
w
)
2r
w
.
As the solutions are not random words, the attacker should first choose the information sets
which have the best chance of being valid. One can see that he will maximize his chances
when choosing the same number of positions in each block, that is, choosing kw positions w
times. The probability of success is then:
Pw,1 =
((n/w−1
k/w
)(
n/w
k/w
) )w = ( rw )w( n
w
)w .
The final probability Pinv of choosing a valid set to invert RSD is: Pinv = Pw,1×Nw = (
r
w )
2r
w
.
Note that it does not depend on n.
For collisions, one needs to find a 2-regular word with null syndrome. If i is the number
of non-zero blocks in this word, the number of such words is:
Ni =
(
w
i
)(
n/w
2
)i
2r
.
Using, as for inversion, an equal repartition of the information set among the blocks, that
is, kw positions in each block, we get, for each value of i, the probability of validity:
Pi,1 =
(
w
i
)(
n/w−k/w
2
)i(
w
i
)(
n/w
2
)i =
(
r/w
2
)i(
n/w
2
)i .
The total probability of success for one information set is then:
Pcol total =
w∑
i=1
(
w
i
)(
r/w
2
)i
2r
=
1
2r
[( r
w
2
)
+ 1
]w
.
3 one simply has to perform a Gaussian elimination on the matrix, using the columns outside the
chosen information set.
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However the adversary may decide to use another strategy and look for specific words.
He can consider words with non-zero positions only in a given set of w0 < w blocks, take
all the information set points available in the remaining w − w0 blocks and distribute the
rest of the information set in the w0 chosen blocks. The probability of success is then:
Pcol w0 =
1
2r
[( n
w − k0w0
2
)
+ 1
]w0
=
1
2r
[( r
w0
2
)
+ 1
]w0
,
with k0 = k − (w − w0) × nw = n·w0w − r. As the attacker has the possibility to choose the
best strategy, he can choose the most suitable value for w0 (as long as it remains smaller
than w):
Pcol optimal =
1
2r
max
w0∈J1;wK
[( r
w0
2
)
+ 1
]w0
.
It is shown in [1] that this maximum is reached for w0 = α · r, where α ≈ 0.24 is a constant,
and that:
Pcol optimal =
1
2r
[( 1
α
2
)
+ 1
]αr
' 2 r3.3 .
4.2 Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Problem
We now describe the attack from Coron and Joux [4], which relies on the Generalized
Birthday Problem introduced by Wagner [19], who established:
Theorem 1. Let L1, L2,. . . ,L2a be 2a lists of r bits strings, each list being of size L = 2
r
a+1 .
Then a solution to the equation x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x2a = 0, with xi ∈ Li, can be found in time
O(2a2
r
a+1 ).
Let us recall the algorithm. At first step 2a lists of size L are given. Then the lists are merged
pair by pair to create a new list: for instance, the merge L1 ./ L2 of the lists L1 and L2 is
made from the sum of the elements x1, x2 of L1, L2 such that x1 ⊕ x2 is zero on the first
r
a+1 bits. One readily checks that the size L1 ./ L2 is still 2
r
a+1 on average. Using sorting
algorithms, this merge operation can be done in time O(r2
r
a+1 ) (one can eliminate the r
factor, and thus obtain Wagner’s complexity, using hash tables, however this will require
larger memory space). Once the 2a−1 new lists are obtained, one proceeds recursively, until
there are only two remaining lists (See Fig. 2). Then a collision is found between these two
lists using the classical birthday paradox. Since there are 2a merge operations, the total
complexity is O(r2a2
r
a+1 ).
This algorithm translates into an attack for collisions as follows. Each list Li is associated
to w2a blocks of the matrix, and contains the syndromes of 2-regular words, of weight less
than or equal to 2w2a , defined over these blocks. Finding a solutionHx1⊕Hx2⊕· · ·⊕Hx2a = 0
gives a collision.
The adversary will try to optimize a in order to get the lowest complexity. But the
auxiliary a is subject to the following constraint: each list (of size L = 2
r
a+1 ) can not be
larger than the number of words of weight 2w2a (or lower), which are part of a 2-regular word,
with a given set of blocks. Since in each block there are
( n
w
2
)
+1 words of weight 2 or 0, this
gives:
r
a+ 1
≤ w
2a
log2
[( n
w
2
)
+ 1
]
,
or equivalently:
2a
a+ 1
≤ w
r
log2
[( n
w
2
)
+ 1
]
. (1)
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Fig. 2. Application of Wagner’s algorithm to collision search. All the lists remain of constant size
L = 2
r
a+1 . On average, there remains a single solution at the end of the algorithm.
This shows that a can not grow as desired by the adversary. In the case of inversion search,
the constraint is that the size of the list must be smaller than the number of regular words
of weight w2a , with 1’s in some
w
2a blocks. This gives, similarly to the collision case:
2a
a+ 1
≤ w
r
log2(
n
w
). (2)
4.3 Extension of Wagner’s Algorithm to Non-Fitting Cases
In general, it may be the case that the size L = 2` of the lists to be dealt with is not exactly
2
r
a+1 .
We first deal with the case when ` < ra+1 . In that case, we apply Wagner’s method,
with the constraint of zeroing ` bits of the partial sums (instead of ra+1 ) during each merge
operation, hence keeping lists of constant size. So, the two remaining lists, at the end of
the recursion, will only have (a − 1)` bits equal to zero. Then the probability to have a
collision between these two lists is 2
(a+1)`
2r . If the algorithm fails and there is no collision,
then the whole process is started from the beginning, choosing another set of bits to be set
to zero. Since the complexity of building the two final lists is O(`2a2`), the total cost is
O(`2r+a−a`). Again, for this complexity to hold, the size of the list must be smaller than
2
r
a+1 . The contrary would correspond to having more than one collision in the end, which
won’t help improving the complexity.
Secondly, we deal with the case when ` > ra+1 . Here the strategy is to prepare each list
using a precomputation step, by zeroing a few bits in a each list. We shall denote by α this
number of bits and calculate its optimal value. After zeroing α bits, the size of the lists is on
average 2`−α. In the context of the hash function, this precomputation step is performed by
using two sublists and merging them using the birthday paradox. Then Wagner’s algorithm
is applied to set to zero the r′ = r − α remaining bits. Ideally α is chosen to fit the new
parameters of Wagner’s algorithm: we must have `− α = r′a+1 . Solving these two equations
gives:
α =
`(a+ 1)− r
a
and r′ =
a+ 1
a
(r − `),
and the total cost of Wagner’s algorithm is O(r′2a2
r′
a+1 ). Note that preparing all the lists,
with the birthday paradox, costs O(2a2
`
2 ), so there might be a concern that this step becomes
preponderant. Solving the inequalities tells us that this is only the case when ` > 2ra+2 ,
which means that we fall in the range where a+ 1 could have been used for the attack (see
Equations (1) and (2)).
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4.4 Some Security Curves
The curves on Fig. 3 show how the different attacks described in this section behave when
applied to concrete parameters. It is clear that the attack based on Wagner’s Generalized
Birthday Paradox gives far better results than Information Set Decoding techniques applied
to regular words. This is mainly because Information Set Decoding algorithms are efficient
when applied to a problem having a single solution. This is often the case when decoding a
random code, but here, each instance has a huge number of solutions.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the costs of the different attacks as a function of w when r = 400 and
n = 216. On the left when applied to inversion and on the right to collision search. The vertical
scale corresponds to the logarithm of the work-factor required to perform Information Set Decoding
(dashed line), Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Paradox (dotted line) or Extended Wagner Paradox
(plain line).
It is also important to note that, for a same security level, the scope of available param-
eters is much wider if one is only looking for a one-way function (no collision resistance).
For instance, with r = 400 and n = 216, for a security of 280operations, w could be chosen
anywhere in the interval J0; 145K instead of J0; 67K.
4.5 Asymptotical Behavior
We want to prove that, even though a can vary depending on the parameters, when r goes
to infinity a can not grow fast enough to make Wagner’s attack sub-exponential. The only
constraint on a is:
2a
a+ 1
≤ w
r
log2
( n
w
)
.
If we consider n and w as polynomial in r (noted Poly (r)), then nw is also polynomial in r
and we have:
2a
a+ 1
≤ Poly (r) log2 (Poly (r)) .
From this we deduce a = Poly (log2 r). Asymptotically, the best attack having a cost of
O(r2a2
r
a+1 ) remains thus exponential in r. Moreover, it should be possible to find parameters
which scale well when trying to increase the security level.
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The simplest solution to achieve so is to scale the parameters linearly with r. For instance,
suppose we have two constants ω and ν such that w = ω × r and n = ν × r. We get:
2a
a+ 1
≤ ω log2
( ν
ω
)
so a ' log2 ω log2 log2
ν
ω
= κ a constant.
This means that the best a an attacker can use will remain constant whatever the value
of r. Asymptotically this construction will scale with:
– exponential security: 2
r
a+1 = 2O(r),
– constant block size: log2
n
w = log2
ν
ω = constant (
n
w remains a power of 2),
– linear hash cost: NXOR = r2ωr(ω log νω−1) = O (r),
– quadratic matrix size: r × n = r2ν = O (r2).
Using this method it is possible to convert any set of efficient parameters to another
efficient set giving any other required security, by simply scaling r.
4.6 Weak Instances
As defined in Section 3.3, a weak instance will correspond to a matrix H for which there
exists an algorithm being able to find a collision (a 2-regular word having a null syndrome)
with a complexity lower than that of the best attack: here the Wagner-based attack. We
shall hence go over known attacks and evaluate the number of weak instances each one will
generate.
Instances for which the Wagner-based attack can have a complexity lower than the
average are those for which, when using smaller lists all along the algorithm, there remains,
on average, one solution in the end. However, this is only possible if the matrix is not of
full rank: the algorithm can then be applied using r′ = Rank(H) instead of r. However, the
probability of H not being full rank is very small (about O (2r−n)) and these weak instances
can be neglected.
Concerning the Information Set Decoding attack, instances which will have a low com-
plexity will also represent a negligible proportion of all possible matrices: it requires that
there is an abnormally large amount of solutions of low weight, so that when choosing a
random information set, it will have a larger probability of being valid. This probability will
be even smaller than that of H not being of full rank.
The only remaining property which could weaken an instance against collision search is
the presence of a very low weight collision (say 2w0). This way, a brute force search among
all low weight words could find this collision with a lower complexity. A search among all
words of weight up to 2w0 will have, using the birthday paradox, a complexity of O
(√Nw0)
where Nw0 denotes the number of 2-regular words of weight 2w0. This attack will hence only
be of interest for values of w0 such that Nw0 < 2
2r
a+1 (the square of the average complexity
of the Wagner-based attack). The probability that an instance has a solution of weight
2w0 is O
(Nw0
2r
)
and thus the proportion of such weak instances can not be larger than
O
(
2(a−1)
−r
a+1
)
, which, as we will see in the next section, will always be negligible for secure
parameters.
We can hence conclude that no known attack yields a non negligible proportion of weak
instances in our construction.
5 Proposed Parameters
Usually hash functions have a security of 2
r
2 against collisions, that is, the best attack
is based on the classical birthday paradox. In our case this would correspond to a being
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equal to 1 at most. However, if this is the case, F will necessarily have an input shorter
than its output and this is incompatible with the chaining method. If we want to have an
input size larger than the output size (i.e. compression), then the attacker will always have
the possibility to choose at least a = 3 (when looking for collisions). If we suppose our
parameters place us exactly at a point where an attacker can use a = 3, we have:
r =
(3 + 1)w
23
log2
[( n
w
2
)
+ 1
]
≥ w
2
log2
[( n
w
)2
× 1
2
]
= w log2
( n
w
)
− w
2
.
If this is the case we will then have:
NXOR ≥ rww
2
= 2r.
For a security of 280 and with a = 3 we would need at least r = 320 and hence at least
640 binary XORs per input document bit. This is not so huge in practice but it would still
give a relatively slow hash rate. For instance, it is just above 10 Mbits/s, using a vanilla C
implementation on a Pentium 4.
If we instead choose to limit the attacker to a = 4 we will have much more freedom in
the parameter choice. First of all, we get:
NXOR = rw(1− 58) log2 ( nw )+ 516w.
Changing the values of n and w (which are still linked by the constraint a = 4) will let
us change the hash cost. However, as we see on Fig. 4, the lowest values for NXOR also
correspond to the largest values of n and so, to larger matrix sizes. Table 1 collects a list of
parameter sets all corresponding to a = 4 and r = 400, that is, a security of 280. In fact,
practical security will be a little higher as we have neglected a r2a factor. The security should
hence rather be around 292 operations, and an exact security of 280 would be achieved with
r = 340. However an attacker with huge memory can get rid of the r factor. We will hence
stick to the 2
r
a+1 approximation of the security.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of log2 n (on the left) and NXOR (on the right) as a function of w for r = 400
when always staying as close as possible to the point a = 4.
If we choose to use the set of parameters where log2
n
w = 8, which is very convenient for
software implementation, we will have at the same time a good efficiency (7 times faster than
10
Table 1. Possible parameters for r = 400 and a = 4.
log2
ą
n
w
ć
w n NXOR matrix size
16 41 2 686 976 64.0 ∼ 1 Gbit
15 44 1 441 792 67.7 550 Mbits
14 47 770 048 72.9 293 Mbits
13 51 417 792 77.6 159 Mbits
12 55 225 280 84.6 86 Mbits
11 60 122 880 92.3 47 Mbits
10 67 68 608 99.3 26 Mbits
9 75 38 400 109.1 15 Mbits
8 85 21 760 121.4 8.3 Mbits
7 98 12 544 137.1 4.8 Mbits
6 116 7 424 156.8 2.8 Mbits
5 142 4 544 183.2 1.7 Mbits
4 185 2 960 217.6 1.1 Mbits
when trying to force a = 3) and a reasonable matrix size. As we have seen in Section 4.5,
we can then scale these parameters. We have ω = 85400 = 0.2125 and ν = 256 × ω = 54.4.
If we now want to hash with a security of 2128 (equivalent to that of SHA-256) we simply
need to use r = 128× (a+ 1) = 640 and so w = 640× ω = 136 and n = 34816.
We propose three sets of parameters giving a security of 280 against collision search
for different output hash sizes. Each of these sets can be scaled linearly to obtain a better
security.
– Short Hash: r = 320, w = 42 and log2
n
w = 8. This solution has a hash size of 320 bits
only, but is quite slow with a throughput around 10 Mbits/s.
– Fast Hash: r = 480, w = 170 and log2
n
w = 8. This solution will be very fast (around
90 Mbits/s) with still a reasonable matrix size (20 Mbits).
– Intermediate: r = 400, w = 85 and log2
n
w = 8. This is in our opinion the best
compromise, with reasonable hash length and matrix size and still a good efficiency
(around 70 Mbits/s).
If looking only for a one-way function (no collision resistance) then we have the choice
to either be faster, or have a smaller output.
– Short One-Way: r = 240, w = 40 and log2
n
w = 8. This solution has an output of only
240 bits and should work at around 70 Mbits/s.
– Fast One-Way: r = 480, w = 160 and log2
n
w = 16. This solution uses a very large
matrix (4 Gbits) but should have a throughput above 200 Mbits/s.
6 Comparison to Existing Hash Functions
As stated at the beginning of Section 5, from a practical security point of view, our functions
are somehow weaker than other existing functions: we will never be able to reach a security
of O (2 r2 ) against collision search. Accordingly, the output size of our functions will always
have to be above 320 bits.
The description of one of our function will also always be much larger than that of other
functions: the matrix should be included in the description and is always quite large when
looking for fast hashing. However, as long as one uses parameters for which the matrix isn’t
of many Gigabits this shouldn’t cause any problem.
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Table 2. Throughputs of some other hash functions, using the crypto++ library [5].
Algorithm Mbits/s
MD5 1730
RIPEMD-160 420
SHA-1 544
SHA-512 90
From a speed point of view, our functions also seem much slower than existing functions.
For instance, as seen in Table 2, using Wei Dai’s crypto++ library, other hash functions
are much faster than the 90 Mbits/s of Fast Hash. One should however take into account
the fact that these 90 Mbits/s are obtained using a very basic C implementation, taking no
advantage of the extended Pentium operations (MMX, SSE. . . ).
The operations in FSB are however very simple: the only costly operations are binary
XORs. Hence what will slow the process will mainly be memory access problems as the
matrix H has no chance to fit in the machine’s CPU cache. Without any fully optimized
implementation of the algorithm it seems hard to estimate the place left for improvement.
However, depending of the use made of the hash function, the flexibility in the parameter
choice of FSB can compensate this lack of speed. Imagine hashing for a 1024 bits RSA
signature: you need to output a 1024 bits hash and at the same time do not require a
security higher than 280 as it would be higher than that of the RSA part of the signature.
For such application, with r = 1024, one could use one of the following parameter sets:
a security log2
n
w w n NXOR matrix size
11 285 8 11655 2 983 680 129 3 Gbits
8 2113 8 1942 497 152 137 485 Mbits
Still using our basic implementation this would yield throughputs around 70Mbits/s,
which is not bad for a 1024 bits hash function. It seems that, for FSB, the throughput will
depend more on the required security level than on the output hash size.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a family of fast and provably secure hash functions. This construction
enjoys some interesting features: both the block size of the hash function and the output
size are completely scalable; the security depends directly of the output size and is truly
exponential, it can hence be set to any desired level; the number of XORs used by FSB per
input bit can be decreased to improve speed.
However, reaching very high output rates requires the use of a large matrix. This can be a
limitation when trying to use FSB on memory constrained devices. On classical architectures
this will only fix a maximum speed.
Another important point is the presence of weak instances of this hash function: it is
clear that the matrix H can be chosen with bad properties. For instance, the all zero matrix
will define a hash function with constant zero output. However, these bad instances only
represent a completely negligible proportion of all the matrices and when choosing a matrix
at random there is no real risk of choosing such a weak instance.
Also note that it is easy to introduce a trapdoor in a matrix by simply choosing one
column to be the sum of some other columns of the matrix. This will then allow the person
who generated the matrix to easily generate collisions. As stated by Preneel in [15], it is
possible to avoid this problem if the matrix generation is reproducible by a user. The matrix
could then simply be the output of a pseudo-random generator and this would solve both
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the problems of trapdoors and that of the huge matrix size. However, the security proof
would no longer apply.
Finally, concerning the hash size/collision security ratio, this construction does not allow
to have the usual ratio of 2, obtained when using a classical birthday paradox to find
collisions. This can be changed by simply applying a final output transformation to the last
hash: this transformation can further compress it to a size of twice the expected security
against collision search. Further work has then to be done to study the required properties
of this final transformation, both from a theoretical point of view, in order to keep the well
founded security of these scheme, and from the practical point of view, in order to propose
sound parameters.
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A NP-completeness Proofs
The most general problem we want to study concerning syndrome decoding with regular
words is:
b-regular Syndrome Decoding (b-RSD)
Input: w binary matrices Hi of dimension r × n and a bit string S of length r.
Property: there exists a set of b×w′ columns (with 0 < w′ ≤ w), 0 or b columns in each Hi,
summing to S.
Note that, in this problem, b is not an input parameter. The fact that for any value of b
this problem is NP-complete is much stronger than simply saying that the problem where
b is an instance parameter is NP-complete. This also means that there is not one, but an
infinity of such problems (one for each value of b). However we consider them as a single
problem as the proof is the same for all values of b.
The two following sub-problems are derived from the previous one. They correspond
more precisely to the kind of instances that an attacker on the FSB hash function would
need to solve.
Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD)
Input: w matrices Hi of dimension r × n and a bit string S of length r.
Property: there exists a set of w columns, 1 per Hi, summing to S.
2-regular Null Syndrome Decoding (2-RNSD)
Input: w matrices Hi of dimension r × n.
Property: there exists a set of 2× w′ columns (with 0 < w′ ≤ w), taking 0 or 2 columns in
each Hi summing to 0.
It is easy to see that all of these problems are in NP. To prove that they are NP-complete
we will use a reduction similar to the one given by Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg
for syndrome decoding [3]. We will use the following known NP-complete problem.
Three-Dimensional Matching (3DM)
Input: a subset U ⊆ T × T × T where T is a finite set.
Property: there is a set V ⊆ U such that |V | = |T | and no two elements of V agree on any
coordinate.
Let’s study the following example: let T = {1, 2, 3} and |U | = 5
U1 = (1, 2, 2)
U2 = (2, 2, 3)
U3 = (1, 3, 2)
U4 = (2, 1, 3)
U5 = (3, 3, 1)
One can see that the set consisting of U1,U4 and U5 verifies the property. However if you
remove U1 from U then no solution exist. In our case it is more convenient to represent an
instance of this problem in another way: we associate a 3|T | × |U | binary incidence matrix
A to the instance. For the previous example it would give the matrix shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Incidence matrix corresponding to an instance of 3DM.
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
122 223 132 213 331
1 1 0 1 0 0
2 0 1 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
2 1 1 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 0 1 0 0
3 0 1 0 1 0
A solution to the problem will then be a subset of |T | columns summing to the all-1
column. Using this representation, we will now show that any instance of this problem can
be reduced to solving an instance of RSD, hence proving that RSD is NP-complete.
Reductions of 3DM to RSD. Given an input U ⊆ T × T × T of the 3DM problem, let
A be the 3|T | × |U | incidence matrix described above. For i from 1 to |T | we take Hi = A.
If we try to solve the RSD problem on these matrices with w = |T | and S = (1, . . . , 1)
a solution will exist if and only if we are able to add w ≤ |T | columns of A (possibly many
times the same one) and obtain a column of 1s. As all the columns of A contain only three
1s, the only way to have 3 × |T | 1s at the end is that during the adding no two columns
have a 1 on the same line (each time two columns have a 1 on the same line the final weight
decreases by 2). Hence the |T | chosen columns will form a suitable subset V for the 3DM
problem.
This means that if we are able to give an answer to this RSD instance, we will be able
to answer the 3DM instance we wanted to solve. Thus RSD is NP-complete.
Reduction of 3DM to b-RSD. This proof will be exactly the same as the one above.
The input is the same, but this time we build the following matrix:
B =
A
A
A
0
0
the block matrix with b times A
on the diagonal
Now we take Hi = B and use S = (1, . . . , 1). The same arguments as above apply here
and prove that for any given value of b, if we are able to give an answer to this b-RSD
instance, we will be able to answer the 3DM instance we wanted to solve. Hence, for any b,
b-RSD is NP-complete.
Reduction of 3DM to 2-RNSD. We need to construct a matrix for which solving a
2-RNSD instance is equivalent to solving a given 3DM instance. A difficulty is that, this
time, we can’t choose S = (1, . . . , 1) as this problem is restricted to the case S = 0. For this
reason we need to construct a somehow complicated matrix H which is the concatenation
of the matrices Hi we will use. It is constructed as shown in Fig. 5.
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H =
A 0
Id Id
0
A 0
Id Id
0
A 0
Id
Id
Id
Id
0
0
0
01
0
U
1
1T
1T( )
0
Fig. 5. The matrix used to reduce 3DM to 2-RNSD.
This matrix is composed of three parts: the top part with the A matrices, the middle
part with pairs of identity |U | × |U | matrices, and the bottom part with small lines of 1s.
The aim of this construction is to ensure that a solution to 2-RNSD on this matrix (with
w = |T |+1) exists if and only if one can add |T | columns of A and a column of 1s to obtain
0. This is then equivalent to having a solution to the 3DM problem.
The top part of the matrix will be the part where the link to 3DM is placed: in the
2-RNSD problem you take 2 columns in some of the block, our aim is to take two columns
in each block, and each time, one in the A sub-block and one in the 0 sub-block. The middle
part ensures that when a solution chooses a column in H it has to choose the only other
column having a 1 on the same line so that the final sum on this line is 0. This means that
any time a column is chosen in one of the A sub-blocks, the “same” column is chosen in the
0 sub-block. Hence in the final 2w′ columns, w′ will be taken in the A sub-blocks (or the 1
sub-block) and w′ in the 0 sub-blocks. You will then have a set of w′ columns of A or 1 (not
necessarily distinct) summing to 0. Finally, the bottom part of the matrix is there to ensure
that if w′ > 0 (as requested in the formulation of the problem) then w′ = w. Indeed, each
time you pick a column in the block number i, the middle part makes you have to pick one
in the other half of the block, creating two ones in the final sum. To eliminate these ones
the only way is to pick some columns in the blocks i− 1 and i+1 and so on, until you pick
some columns in all of the w blocks.
As a result, we see that solving an instance of 2-RNSD on H is equivalent to choosing
|T | columns in A (not necessarily different) all summing to 1. As in the previous proof, this
concludes the reduction and 2-RNSD is now proven NP-complete.
It is interesting to note that instead of using 3DM we could directly have used RSD for
this reduction. You simply replace the A matrices with the w blocks of the RSD instance
you need to solve and instead of a matrix of 1s you put a matrix containing columns equal
to S. Then the reduction is also possible.
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